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Abstract 
Purpose – Large multinational companies (MNCs) are strongly formalized, often standardized and complex with multiple hierarchical 
levels. Over the past few decades, MNCs have strengthened their coordination and control systems by creating regional headquarters 
(RHQs). This study aims to investigate how MNCs rearticulate control dimensions at RHQs, to coordinate and exert control over 
subsidiaries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Design/methodology/approach – Based on a survey of 86 French MNCs in the Asia-Pacific region, this study applies a structural 
equation model to determine RHQs’ roles in the field of regional decision-making, coordination and control. 
Findings – Large MNCs, with a significant presence in Asia, transfer coordination and control to RHQs, in a way that leads us to propose 
the use of the expression “regio-centralization.” RHQs become socialization hubs, where most regional decisions are taken and where 
international managers meet. MNCs mobilize at the same time expatriates, short-term assignees and local managers who intensively 
interact at RHQs. Thus, informal control at RHQs increases, partly substituting formal control by HQs. Smaller MNCs, without RHQs, 
on the contrary, base their control and coordination on the formalization of HQs-subsidiary relations, especially through strong reporting, 
in combination with centralized decision-making at HQs. 
Research limitations/implications – This study is based on MNCs from one specific country, France,  and focuses only on the 
dynamic Asia-Pacific host region. Coordination and control in less dynamic regions may reveal different results. 
Originality/value – This study leads to a better understanding of how large MNCs reorganize dispersed activities in the Asia-Pacific 
region by creating RHQs, where important control and coordination functions are relocated. 
Keywords Centralization-formalization-socialization, Control, Multinational companies, Regional headquarters, Asia-
Pacific region 
Paper type Research paper 
 
Introduction 
Multinational companies (MNCs) have more and more subsidiaries in countries around the world that they must 
coordinate and control. Large organizations tend to be formalized, standardized and complex and their structure 
typically features numerous hierarchical levels. In turn, as emphasized by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), they look 
for flexibility or the locate. In other words, MNCs need to balance efficiency derived from standardization and 
local adaptation. Thus, coordination and control are critical albeit difficult issues for large MNCs. The creation of 
regional headquarters (RHQs), in the search for this balance, appears to be a key issue (Alfoldi et al., 2012; Ambos, 
2016). 
Rugman and Brain (2003), Rugman and Verbeke (2008), as well as Oh and Rugman (2014), underline that MNCs 
expand in specific regions, and not all around the world because of the difficulties of managing activities globally. 
Most MNCs concentrate their activities in two main regions, such as Europe and North America or Europe and Asia. 
Ral-Trebacz et al. (2018) find that intra-regional expansion leads to an increase in firm performance, while inter-
regional expansion leads to a decrease. Verbeke and Asmussen (2016) emphasize that the regional level is the key 
locus for strategy formation; RHQs are implemented to support that aim. 
 
 
In this context, control pertains to the process by which one entity influences, to varying degrees, the behavior and 
output of another entity through the use of power, authority and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and informal 
mechanisms (Geringer and Hebert, 1989,p. 236). Scholars emphasize the diversity of instruments that MNCs 
implement to control their subsidiaries abroad (Kumar and Seth, 1998; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Schaan, 1988). 
A judicious combination of several mechanisms appears key to successful control, such as the share of capital in 
a subsidiary, the number of expatriates, the formalization of the organization, training and socialization programs 
for local staff. 
Research on the articulation of control mechanisms has produced a theoretically well- established 
centralization–formalization–socialization framework of control (Ambos and Schlegelmich, 2010; Nobel and 
Birkinshaw, 1998; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989). Centralization refers to hierarchical decision-making processes 
whereby headquarters (HQs) makes most decisions or on the contrary, provides subsidiaries with a specified 
degree of autonomy that allows them to make decisions about their own strategies. Formalization pertains to 
written procedures and manuals that attempt to ensure that orders and routine work are properly performed. 
Socialization is the development of shared values, corporate culture and informal control at all levels in the MNC. 
Various mechanisms contribute to each dimension of the framework. For instance, written rules, procedures, job 
descriptions and reporting contribute to the formalization dimension; staff mobility, training and informal personal 
relations contribute to the socialization dimension (Amann et al., 2017; Ambos and Schlegelmich, 2010; Nobel 
and Birkinshaw, 1998; Ghoshal and Nohria, 1989). 
During recent decades, MNCs have often strengthened their coordination and control mechanisms by creating 
RHQs (Nell et al., 2011; Kostova et al., 2016). Yeung et al. (2001) show that Western MNCs frequently set up 
RHQs in Asia with the aim of staying globally integrated and efficient while also becoming more responsive to 
local opportunities and threats. Nell et al. (2011, pp. 100–101) emphasize that RHQs “manage economies of scale 
and scope within the region through means of centralization, formalization and socialization.” However, Nell et 
al. (2017) call for further research for a deeper understanding of the emergence, management and consequences 
of geographically dispersed HQs. 
Noting these trends, the current study considers the following research question: when MNCs set up RHQs, 
how do control dimensions get rearticulated at RHQs to coordinate and exert control over subsidiaries? Do HQs 
transfer control and coordination to RHQs, which then serve as a bridge between the Asia-Pacific region and the 
MNCs’ HQs? In other words, how is the classic centralization–formalization–socialization model of control affected 
by the creation of RHQs? To answer this research question, we propose a set of hypotheses that reflect the findings 
of the recent literature and the results of qualitative interviews that we held with expatriated managers in the Asia-
Pacific region (Amann et al., 2014, 2017). We test these hypotheses with a quantitative survey completed by 
representatives of 86 French MNCs in the Asia-Pacific area between 2015 and 2019. We apply a structural 
equation model, linking the presence of RHQs to the four main dimensions of coordination and control, which are 
centralization, formalization, socialization and expatriation. 
This research makes the following main contributions. We specify how large MNCs transfer coordination and 
control to the RHQs level, leading us to propose the expression “regio-centralization.” RHQs become international 
socialization hubs, where most regional decisions are taken and where international managers meet. MNCs 
mobilize at the same time expatriates, short-term assignees and local managers who intensively interact at these 
RHQs. Thus, informal control at RHQs increases, partly substituting formal control by HQs. On the contrary, smaller 
MNCs, without RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region, base their control and coordination on the formalization of the 
HQs-subsidiary relationships, especially through strong reporting in combination with centralized decision-making 
at the HQs. 
This article is structured as follows. The following section details the theoretical background, underlining why 
MNCs set up regional management centers and how this affects the organization of control and coordination. On 
the basis of this literature review, we propose a set of hypotheses. We then outline our empirical methodology, data 
collection and the structural model estimation, including tests of our hypotheses. The last two sections are devoted 
to the statistical results and a discussion on their implications. 
 
Theoretical background and hypotheses formulation 
As noted, we investigate how control dimensions might be rearticulated at a regional level when MNCs set up 
RHQs. The literature review first considers regional structures development and then the centralization–




Regionalization of multinational companies 
Regionalization of management means that a firm establishes intermediate hierarchical management structures in 
a geographically distant region, such as Asia, Latin America or the Middle East and North-Africa, to which the 
corporate HQs transfers management responsibilities. This is in line with Schütte and Selmer (1997, p. 441) early 
definition of a “regional organization,” which consists of transferring authority to RHQs “to solve problems in the 
region, which cannot be handled by the national units, and otherwise would have to be dealt with and acted upon by 
HQs.” 
Regionalization is developing rapidly, especially in dynamic regions such as Asia (Arregle et al., 2016; Ambos 
and Schlegelmich, 2010). Piekkari et al. (2010, p. 527) state that the: 
[.. .] persistence of cultural, geographic and language distances, the lack of social integration and strong economic growth 
strengthened the position of the regional organization [.. .] in the turbulent, distant region of Asia-Pacific. 
Kostova et al. (2016, p. 180) confirm that “many MNCs had begun developing regional centers of coordination 
and control to better seize regional opportunities, and leverage local resources and knowledge throughout the entire 
organization.” 
Belderbos et al. (2017), acknowledging that “the emergence of RHQs is one of the responses to the 
regionalization trend in the world economy” (op. cit.: 5), find that most RHQs are located in Europe and the Asia-
Pacific region, less in North America and nearly none in Latin America or Africa. With regard to the country of 
origin, Japanese MNCs do not and Asakawa, 1999), whereas Enright (2005) finds that there are very few 
differences between the responsibilities that American and European firms give to their regional structures in Asia. 
There is an academic debate on what exactly regional management centers are and what they do. Mori (2002) 
ranks regional management centers into RHQs, regional offices, distribution platforms, parts centers, 
representative offices and holding companies, which is consistent with Enright’s (2005) typology (RHQs, regional 
offices and local offices) or Schütte and Selmer (1997) ranking into RHQs, representative offices, holding companies 
and regional organizational units. 
Throughout the academic discussion, the term “RHQs” appears constantly, with varying definitions, which are 
closely aligned. Schütte and Selmer (1997) considers RHQs as organizational units focused on the integration and 
coordination of an MNC’s regional activities, such that they constitute the link between the region and the HQs. 
Yeung et al. (2001, p. 158) define RHQs “as a business establishment that has control and management 
responsibilities for the operations of subsidiaries located in the same host region.” According to Poon and 
Thompson (2003), RHQs “take control over the operations of other subsidiaries located in other countries of a 
region, without having to refer too frequently to parent HQs.” 
What are the specific functions of regional management centers, in general, and RHQs in particular? Research 
by Chakravarty et al. (2017) on Japanese regional management centers shows that the most frequently observed 
regional functions are accessing local markets, regional information collection, knowledge seeking, exporting to 
third countries, as well as establishing distribution and production networks. Arregle et al. (2018) conclude that 
the 547 Japanese multinationals in their sample “integrate their internationalization decisions across countries at 
the regional level.” Both studies, however, focus on Japanese multinationals, which are known for not widely 
delegating management responsibilities to regional structures. 
Hoenen et al. (2013), with a sample of 40 RHQs located in Europe, find that they may undertake entrepreneurial 
activities, such as the recognition, identification, evaluation and exploitation of regional opportunities. Belderbos 
et al. (2017) point out that “RHQ both perform intra-regional coordination and control activities and 
entrepreneurial opportunity- seeking tasks.” The entrepreneurial role comprises “scouting for talent, seeking out 
new business opportunities, signaling commitment to local markets and sharing information with corporate HQ.” 
The second role, which they call, “administrative” includes “serving as the command, control and coordination 
center of dispersed activities in the region, orchestrating resource pooling and leading the effort to achieve intrafirm 
synergy.” 
Close to this distinction, Alfoldi et al. (2012, pp. 284–285), based on a case study of a large Anglo-Dutch MNC, 
find evidence that regional management centers in Europe perform “entrepreneurial and/or integrative roles.” The 
entrepreneurial role includes strategic direction provision, human resources recruitment and resource development 
on a regional level, as well as seeking and exploiting new opportunities. The integrative role “entails a strong 
element of monitoring and control,” local human resource management, knowledge sharing through a series of 
 
 
activities, which might be qualified as socialization, including, “phone and email exchanges, benchmark visits, 
training, workshops [.. .] team-building, expatriation, joint projects, job swaps, coaching.” Our research question 
on how control dimensions are rearticulated at RHQs is more related to what Belderbos et al. (2017) call the 
administrative role and what Alfoldi et al. (2012) call the integrative role of RHQs. 
 
The centralization–formalization–socialization framework of control 
The centralization–formalization–socialization framework goes back to Ghoshal and Nohria (1989), who argue that 
optimal HQs–subsidiary relations require a combination of centralized decision-making, formalization and 
normative integration. Centralization, they explain, refers to hierarchical decision-making, such that HQs make 
most of the crucial decisions. They regard formalization as routine decision-making and resource allocation, with 
the help of manuals, standing orders and procedures. Normative integration, leading to shared values, includes 
periods during which subsidiaries’ managers work at HQs, HQ’s mentors for subsidiaries’ managers, and HQs 
visits to subsidiaries. Normative integration refers to socialization, a widely used term in organization theory. Nine 
years later, Nobel and Birkinshaw (1998) confirmed that these three modes of control – centralization, 
formalization and socialization – had been well-established in organization theory. Ambos and Schlegelmich 
(2010) also acknowledge that the wide range of control mechanisms implemented by MNCs can be articulated 
according to the three dimensions that Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) identified. 
Harzing and Noorderhaven (2006) also identify three control mechanisms: 
(1) Autonomy, which is the opposite of centralization (e.g. design, pricing and advertising of products for 
local markets). 
(2) Socialization and networks (e.g. international task forces, training, informal communication with HQs 
and shared values). 
(3) Formal control (formalization, planning, reporting and enterprise resource planning (ERP)). 
Moreover, they consider expatriation (number, nationality and key positions of expatriates) as a stand-alone, 
complementary control mechanism. In this sense, they extend the centralization–formalization–socialization 
framework.  
Amann et al. (2017) find that, to retain control over their Asian subsidiaries, MNCs articulate four main 
mechanisms: 
(1) Centralization of decision-making at HQs. 
(2) Formalization of both the organization of subsidiaries and the relationships between subsidiaries and 
HQs. 
(3) Informal contacts and socialization through frequent short-term missions and visits, facilitated by the 
establishment of RHQs. 
(4) Expatriation. 
 
These results are similar to Harzing and Noorderhaven’s (2006) findings, yet they are based on different samples 
and methodologies. 
We adopt in our structural equation model the extended centralization–formalization– socialization-expatriation 
framework. On the basis of this extended framework, we seek to answer our research question: how are control 
dimensions rearticulated at RHQs to coordinate and exert control over subsidiaries? Accordingly, we offer a set 
of four hypotheses, H1 to H4. 
Regarding the centralization dimension of control, RHQs are often created because HQs struggle to manage and 
control the increasing number of subsidiaries in an increasing number of countries. Therefore, decision-making, 
not just control, might be transferred at least partly to RHQs, under the specific guidance of HQs. According to 
the academic literature, strategic decision-making is one of the RHQs functions (Chakravarty et al., 2017). Alfoldi 
et al. (2012, p. 276) identify that both strategic and operational functions are delegated to RHQs, which provides 
several benefits for MNCs: 
• The ability to balance integration and responsiveness within a region. 
 
 
• The exploitation of local operational expertize on a regional level. 
• Relieving HQs of the burden of monitoring remote peripheral agents. 
 
Schotter et al. (2017) and Mahnke et al. (2012) emphasize that RHQs add information processing capacities to the 
MNC at the regional level. Thus, having an RHQs may reduce the need for centralization of decision-making at 
the HQs level. We thus, formulate our first hypothesis: 
H1. Regional structures development by MNCs affects the centralization of decision- 
making. 
 
We break down H1 into two sub-hypotheses, namely: 
S-H1a. Regional structures development by MNCs reduces the centralization of 
decision-making at HQs. 
S-H1b. Regional structures development by MNCs increases the centralization of 
decision-making at RHQs. 
 
Regarding socialization, RHQs become places where expatriates and staff members from HQs or from the global 
network of subsidiaries go to on short-term missions, which increases interactions with local staff and favors 
socialization (Tahvanainen et al., 2005; Mayerhofer et al., 2004). Thus, these authors establish the involvement of 
HQs in socialization via RHQs; this goes against the intuition that socialization is delegated to the regional level 
without the involvement of HQs. Nell et al. (2011, p. 100) affirm that “RHQ act as fundamental drivers of 
socialization mechanisms.” Furthermore, as RHQs provide opportunities to interact with and train local managers, 
and to ensure their loyalty (Wong and Law, 1999), they help in localizing management positions. We thus, 
formulate our second hypothesis: 
H2. Regional structures development by MNCs increases the socialization dimension of 
control. 
With regard to formalization, Nell et al. (2011) found that RHQs strengthens formalization and standardization at 
the regional level. However, to the best of our knowledge, the academic literature does not assert any clear 
influence of regional structures development on the control through formalization at the level of the whole MNC. 
Because RHQs are geographically closer to subsidiaries, with increased direct contact, we might expect fewer 
formal exchanges between subsidiaries and HQs. Yet, the recent development of worldwide ERP systems managed 
centrally by HQs, instead might support stronger formalization (Willis and Chiasson, 2007). However, in line with 
Alfoldi et al. (2012), it should be noted that the development of regional structures leads to the implementation of 
policies adapted to the regional context, which reduces the degree of formalization at the HQ level. 
We thus, formulate our third hypothesis: 
H3. Regional structures development by MNCs reduces the level of HQs control by 
formalization. 
 
Appointing expatriates to key management positions in a subsidiary is often required to develop activities abroad, 
and it is a key instrument of control by HQs over overseas activities (Ando et al., 2008; Edström and Galbraith, 
1997; Perlmutter and Heenan, 1974). MNCs rely on expatriates for several reasons. First, key subsidiaries’ 
management positions require substantial interactivity with HQs; the informal networks that expatriates enjoy 
within the MNC provide a good foundation. Second, managing subsidiaries requires specific knowledge of the 
MNC’s processes; if a subsidiary has been recently created, only expatriates have such knowledge (Schaaper et al., 
2013). However, expatriation is costly, and expatriates are sometimes disoriented and underperform in foreign 
contexts (Tung, 1981). Thus, MNCs also seek to localize management positions, replacing expatriates with locals, 
as long as they can train them and ensure their loyalty to the firm (Selmer, 2003; Wong and Law, 1999). By setting 
 
 
up RHQs, MNCs can reduce the need for expatriates. For instance, an expatriate might serve as chief financial officer 
at the RHQs level, supported by good local finance managers in each subsidiary (Schaaper et al., 2013). Thus, 
RHQs facilitate the localization of management positions. Therefore, RHQs offer a way to reduce the need for 
expatriates in the Asia-Pacific region. We thus, formulate our fourth hypothesis: 
H4. Regional structures development by MNCs reduces the need for expatriates. 




Our hypotheses can be aligned in a structural equations model, as follows: 
In Figure 1, the circles are latent variables or constructs, which measure abstract and not directly observable 
phenomena, requiring the use of indirect variables, called indicating variables or indicators, also frequently 
called manifest, observable or outer model variables (Hair, 2016, p. 6). The structural equation model has one 
exogenous latent variable, regional structures development by MNCs, explaining the five subsequent 






















The type of relationship between latent constructs and their indicating variables can be reflective or 
formative. Conventional measurement practice is based upon reflective measurement, whereby the direction of 
causality is assumed to go from the constructs to the indicators. All our latent constructs are reflective. For 
example, we hypothesize that setting up an RHQs leads to a reinforcement of the socialization dimension of 
control, through HQs   visits and training of local employees (H2). 
Our structural model is a first-order model, which tests only one layer of cause-and-effect relationships 
between latent constructs (Hair, 2016, p. 39). Relationships between latent constructs are called the “structural 
model” or “inner model” with “path coefficients.” The relationships between the latent constructs and their 
respective indicating variables are called the “measurement model” or “outer model.” Each indicating variable is 
statistically linked to its latent construct by “loadings,” in the case of reflective constructs. 
A sample of 86 MNCs, based in the Asia-Pacific region, allows the quantification of the structural 















SmartPLS 3.0, which has several well-known advantages that are particularly useful in our case. In particular, 
PLS-SEM works efficiently with small sample sizes, does not require underlying data to be normally distributed 
and can easily handle single-item latent constructs, with no identification problems. Moreover, PLS-SEM can 
apply to metric, ordinal scaled or binary coded variables. We notice that PLS structural equation modeling is 
more and more used in international management research. 
We carefully followed the six stages of a PLS-SEM approach recommended by Hair (2016): 
(1) Specification of the structural model (Figure 1). 
(2) Measurement of the structural model indicators. 
(3) Data collection and examination. 
(4) Model estimation. 
(5) Evaluation of the quality of the outer measurement models. 
(6) Evaluation of the quality of the structural model. 
 
Measurement of the structural model indicators 
Table 1 contains the latent constructs, their measurements and the variable names reported on the full structural 
equation model. 
Control by centralization at HQ and Control by regio-centralization at RHQs are single- item latent 
constructs, measured by only one indicating variable. Diamantopoulos et al. (2012) state that single-item 
measures should only be used for pragmatic reasons, especially when: 
• The sample size is rather small. 
• Path coefficients of 0.30 and lower are possible. 
• Items of an originating multi-item scale are homogeneous. 
• Indicating items of the original questionnaire are semantically redundant. 
The other latent constructs are measured by two to four indicating variables, operationalized by one or more 
questions on the questionnaire. Each question has its own closed-ended answer scale, 
 
 




which might be binary (0/1), Likert scales or quantitative numbers. Some variables are composites, such as the 
number of functions of RHQs or “level of centralization of decision-making at HQs.” [1] To measure opinions 
and feelings in social sciences, ordinal scales are frequently used. For instance, Harzing and Noorderhaven (2006, 
p. 172) explain that the “subjective constructs in [their] study were measured with multi-item scales” such as a 
“three-item scale measuring the level of formalization.” The answering scales on our questionnaire are based on 
the scales used by leading empirical research studies on control and coordination of overseas subsidiaries (Ghoshal 
and Nohria, 1989; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994; Nobel and Birkinshaw, 1998; Kim et al., 2003; Harzing and 
Noorderhaven, 2006; Ambos and Schlegelmich, 2007). Appendix 2 details these answer scales. 
Data collection and sample description 
We designed an online survey in French and English, which we programmed at the website of the University of 
XXX. The target population for filling in our questionnaire are French MNCs with subsidiaries in the Asia Pacific 
region. It is difficult to assess the exact size of this target population. However, the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs estimate the number of French companies in Asia-Oceania around 8,000, which includes subsidiaries of 
MNCs. 
Thanks to the official paper directories published by the French Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry in 11 countries in Asia and internet websites listing French companies in eight other Asian countries, 
most of them also established by The French Chambers of Commerce and Industry and French embassies, we 
have been able to establish a list of 1,103 expatriated managers, working for French subsidiaries in Asia, with 
their professional and/ or email addresses. 
We carried out the survey between 2015 and 2019. We repeatedly sent requests to fill in our 
questionnaire to the 1,103 contacts of our list. In total, we received 96 completed questionnaires, of which 86 
were fully usable, which is a response rate of 8.7%. 
We received answers from respondents working in 18 Asian countries: 34% were from China, 12% from 
Japan, 7% from Hong Kong, 7% from Malaysia and the remaining 40% from 14 other Asian countries, where no 
single country exceeded 5% of the final sample. The sample provides diversity in terms of both MNC size and the 
nature of their activity: for instance, 7% of the MNCs in our sample are in the natural resources sector (mining 
and agriculture), 57% in the manufacturing industry (heavy industry, machinery, industrial pieces, food industry, 
paper and transport.. .), 26% in the services sector, including banking, transport and communications and 7% are in 
the energy sector (oil, gas and electricity). 
Table 2 contains the main characteristics of the 86 MNCs in our sample. 
According to Hair (2016, p. 20), the minimum sample size for PLS-SEM should be the greater of 10 
times the largest number of indicators used to measure a single construct (n = 50 in our case) and 10 times the 
number of independent constructs in the structural model (n = 40 in our case). With a final sample size of 86 
observations, our research meets this “10 times” rule. However, we have to admit that because of the difficulties 
in getting MNCs to respond to the survey, the sample size is not large enough for confirmatory statistical modeling. 
For this reason, we consider our research to be exploratory. 
 
Model estimation 
We initially estimated the full model with 15 indicating variables and 6 latent constructs with SmartPLS 3.0[2]. 
Three indicating variables did not reveal significant loadings and were omitted from the SEM[3]. The final model 
was estimated with the remaining 12 indicating variables. 
Figure 2 reproduces this structural equation model, estimated with structural path coefficients and the 
levels of significance[4]. 
 
Quality of the outer measurement and structural equation models 
To assess the quality of the six reflective measurement constructs, we used Cronbach’s a, the composite reliability 
(CR) and the average variance extracted (AVE) measures (Hair, 2016). Table 3 provides the main statistics of the 
outer model. 
For measuring the internal consistency reliability, Hair (2016, p. 101) states that the CR measure is more 
appropriate than Cronbach’s a. They add that in advanced research studies, CR values between 0.70 and 0.90 are 
satisfactory, which is the case in our modeling. To assess the convergent validity of constructs, the AVEs must be 
 
 
superior to 0.5, which is the case of the constructs of our modeling. The coefficients of determination (R2) for the 
latent constructs, measuring the model’s predictive accuracy, reveal values ranging from 
 
 
Variable Small MNCs Medium-sized MNC s Large MNCs 
 Number in the sample 33 25 28 
 Percentage of the sample 38% 29% 33% 
 Worldwide sales <e1bn Mean = e4bn e5bn–e35bn 
 Employees worldwide <5,000 Mean = 10,000 10,000–150,000 
 Number of countries worldwide <20 20 to 50 >50 
Table 2. Number of subsidiaries worldwide <20 20 to 50 50 to 500 
 Sales in the Asia-Pacific region < e100m Mean = e380m Mean = e5.5bn 
Main characteristics of the multinational Employees in the Asia-Pacific region <1,000 Mean = 5,000 >5,000 
 Countries in the Asia-Pacific region <5 5 to 10 10 to 30 
companies in our Subsidiaries in the Asia-Pacific region <5 <10 10 to 50 















Notes: * < 0.05; ** < 0.01 






      
Construct Variable name value SD loadings P-value Cron-bach’s a CR AVE R2  
Regional RHQ 0.67 0.47 0.89 0.00 
     
structures Functions_RHQ 3.07 2.52 0.93 0.00      
development No_RMCs 1.09 1.18 0.87 0.00 0.88 0.93 0.81 -  
Centralization           
at HQs Centr_HQ 2.38 1.25 1.0  1.0 1.0 1.0 0.05  
Centralization           
at RHQs Centr_RHQ 2.46 1.19 1.0  1.0 1.0 1.0 0.31  
 Inf_control 3.20 1.02 0.70 0.00      



















































model and summary 
statistics 
 
p = 0.22** 
p = 0.56** 
p = 0.46** 
 
p = – 0.24* 
 







Control by regio- 
centralization at RHQ 
Control by cen- 
tralization at HQ 
 
 
to 0.42. As Hair (2016, p. 175) notes, it is difficult to provide rules of thumb for acceptable R2 values because it 
depends on the model complexity and the research discipline; R2 values of 0.20 are considered high in social 
science disciplines. The final structural model (Appendix 1) shows the loadings of the indicating variables, which 
are all above the 0.5 limit[5]. The test for discriminant validity and the cross-loadings of the indicating variables 
did not reveal any problems. The final structural equation model, retaining only the 12 indicating variables that 
passed the quality tests, did not reveal any collinearity among the latent constructs[6]. Finally, the path coefficients 
of the inner structural model are all significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Results 
Before commenting on our hypotheses, comparative statistics are helpful in better interpreting our structural 
equation model. 
Compared with the 28 MNCs in our sample without an RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region, Table 4 shows 
that the 58 MNCs in our sample with at least one RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region, are larger on a worldwide scale 
(t = 2.64. sign. = 0.01) and have significantly more sales in the region (t = 1.91. sign. = 0.06). All the other 
measures, although not statistically   significant, show a trend that MNCs with at least one RHQs have more 
activities in more countries, more subsidiaries, more employees and more production plants in the Asia- Pacific 
region than MNCs without an RHQs (Table 5). 
Compared to the 58 MNCs with RHQs, the 28 MNCs without RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region base 
their international control system much more on formalized control, especially through strong formal reporting to 
HQs (t = 3.2; sign. = 0.00). On the contrary, the 58 MNCs with at least one RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region 
centralize more decision-making both at HQs (t = 2.40; sign. < 0.02) and at RHQs (t = 3.93; sign. < 0.00), send 
significantly more visitors and short-term assignees to the region (t = 3.93; sign. < 0.00), train significantly more 
their local employees (t = 2.54; sign. < 0.01) and localize significantly more key management positions (t = 2.35; 
sign. < 0.02). 
One might fear differences according to industries. analysis of variance and t-test comparing the average 
latent variables scores for each industry did not reveal any significant difference in the implementation of the 
control dimension between the manufacturing versus service industry. 
Table 6 summarizes the hypotheses and their path coefficient values, which allows us to validate or 
invalidate our predictions. 
The positive and significant value (p = 0.22, sign. = 0.04) of the structural path coefficient 
leading from regional structures development to control by centralization at HQs invalidates H1. The development 
of RHQs or regional management centers does not reduce the centralization of decision-making at HQs. Large 
MNCs on a worldwide scale, with important sales in the Asia-Pacific region, set up one or more regional 
management centers to which they transfer managerial functions. However, while extending their regional 







Table 4. Main characteristics of MNCs with or without RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region (significant differences are italic) 
 
The structural path coefficient leading from regional structures development to control by centralization 
at RHQs (p = 0.56, sign. < 0.00) clearly shows that HQs transfer important coordination and control functions to 
RHQs. Thus, H1b is validated. This combination of transferring important control and coordination functions with 
decision-making autonomy to RHQs, while maintaining a certain level of central decision-making at HQs leads 
us to propose the use of the expression “regio-centralization”. 
The structural path coefficient leading from regional structures development to control by socialization 
has a value of 0.46 (sign. = 0.00). When MNCs set up RHQs and/or other regional management centers in the 
Asia-Pacific region, they increase the level of control by socialization, thus validating H2. The loadings of its 
indicating variables reveal the primary importance of HQs visits and short-term assignments (l = 0.83, sign. = 




Table 5. Comparison of control and coordination mechanisms transferred to MNCs with and without RHQs (significant 

















































































































































































socialization dimension of control. RHQs and other regional management centers become socialization hubs, 
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exchange information informally and develop social networks. The indicator Training (l = 0.61, sign. = 0.00) 
show that RHQs frequently organize training, especially for local managers in the Asia-Pacific region. 
As hypothesized, the path relationship from regional structures development to control by formalization 
shows a significant negative value (p = 0.24, sign. = 0.04), which validates H3. The control by formalization 
construct includes two classic indicating variables, which are reporting to HQs (l = 0.71, sign. = 0.00) and 
subsidiaries are subject to strong formal control by HQs (l = 0.62, sign. = 0.07). Large MNCs with important sales 
in the Asia-Pacific region, when setting up RHQs or other regional management centers, reduce the level of formal 
control they exert over their subsidiaries in that region. At the opposite smaller MNCs without RHQs or 
management centers in the Asia-Pacific region, mainly base control on strong formalization of their activities and 
subsidiaries in the region. 
The coefficient of the structural path leading from Regional structures development to Control by 
expatriation takes a positive value of 0.32 (sign. = 0.00), which invalidates H4. French MNCs, when regionalizing 
their management and control functions at RHQs in the Asia-Pacific, do not reduce the  level  of  expatriation  to  
this  region.  The  loadings  of the indicating variables of the expatriation dimension provide further insight. As 
both the number of expatriates (l = 0.62, sign. = 0.01) and localization of management positions (l = 0.87, sign. = 
0.00) show strong positive loadings, large MNCs, which set up RHQs and other regional management centers in 
the Asia Pacific region still increase the number of expatriates they send while localizing management positions 
to Asian managers. 
Looking closely to the variable “number of expatriates,” we observe indeed that large MNCs with RHQs 
in the Asia-Pacific region maintain a greater mean number of expatriates than MNCs without RHQs (15.7 versus 
8.7). However, when this absolute number of expatriates is divided by the number of subsidiaries or by the number 
of countries where the MNCs have activities in the Asia-Pacific region, the difference between large and small 
MNCs does not appear to be significant. All French MNCs in the region, with or without RHQs, maintain 
expatriates there. Expatriates continue to have a central role in managing the subsidiaries, particularly in exerting 
control, implementing corporate culture, coordinating activities and interacting with managers at HQs. When 
comparing the level of localization of management positions, large MNCs with RHQs employ more local managers 
and engineers to whom they transfer more key responsibilities compared to smaller MNCs without RHQs. This 
ongoing localization of management also explains the significant difference (t = 2.54, sign. = 0.01) between MNCs 
with and without RHQs in their efforts to train local employees. 
 
Discussion 
This study investigates the following research question: how are control dimensions rearticulated at RHQs to 
coordinate and exert control over subsidiaries? In other words, how do HQs transfer control and coordination to 
RHQs? The results of our investigation show that: 
• French MNCs, when creating RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region, do not reduce the 
level of centralized decision-making at the corporate HQs (H1a invalidated). 
• French MNCs, when creating RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region, re-centralize decision- 
making at the regional level (H1b validated). 
• Developing regional management structures in the Asia-Pacific region increases 
control by socialization (H2). RHQs become places where important regional 
decisions are taken, where international managers meet informally and where local 
employees are trained. 
• French MNCs, when setting up RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region, reduce the level of 
formal control of their subsidiaries in that region (H3). On the contrary, French MNCs 
without RHQs rely more on formal control, especially through strong reporting to 
HQs. 
• French MNCs, when setting up RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region, do not reduce the 
level of expatriation to the region (H4 invalidated). Moreover, French MNCs with 





When MNCs become larger and too complex to be managed centrally, they set up RHQs. French MNCs transfer 
coordination and control functions to those RHQs, without releasing central decision-making at the HQs. Using 
Perlmutter and Heenan’s (1974) concept of regio- centrism, we propose calling this “regio-centralization”. 
Referring to Lasserre (1996), Ambos (2016, p. 30) state that “a pioneering aspect of his work lies in the claim 
that RHQs change their parenting profiles over time [.. .] because of the maturing of regional operations.” Thus: 
[.. .] it might be interesting to further build on Lasserre’s seminal work and apply the idea of evolving parenting functions 
not only on the regional, but also on the corporate level (Ambos, 2016, p. 37). 
This is consistent with the assertion by Kostova et al. (2016, p. 180) that “many MNCs had begun developing 
regional centers of coordination and control to better seize regional opportunities, and leverage local resources and 
knowledge throughout the entire organization”. 
From a dynamic perspective, regio-centralization can be viewed as a balance between the control functions 
transferred to RHQs and the remaining decision-making power at HQs. By studying dimensions of control, we 
observe that this process is the result of constant adjustment between RHQs and HQs. 
 
Process of regio-centralization 
Regarding the rearticulating of control dimensions at RHQs to coordinate and exert control over subsidiaries, our 
research provides further interesting findings. 
• Centralization: Large MNCs simultaneously continue to centralize decision-making at HQs while granting 
more decision autonomy to RHQs, under the HQs’ supervision; small MNCs, without RHQs, still centralize 
control and coordination at HQs. 
• Socialization: RHQs become socialization hubs where international managers (expatriates, short-term 
assignees, HQs visitors and local managers) meet; it is an important form of informal coordination. 
Moreover, RHQs develop training of local staff. 
• Formalization: Large MNCs emphasize less formalization but develop informal control at RHQs; small 
MNCs without RHQs hubs still formalize coordination and control of subsidiaries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
• Expatriation: MNCs mobilize all categories of international managers, including expatriates, short-term 
assignees and HQs visitors; at the same time, they localize management and transfer management and 
engineering positions to local  employees. When MNCs develop massively in a given area and in 
strategically sensitive markets, expatriates are still regarded as a crucial developmental resource (Schaaper 
et al., 2013). 
 
Our results reveal the means that RHQs and HQs use to achieve regio-centralization. As noted by Conroy et al. 
(2017), increased delegation of decision-making responsibility from corporate HQs to subsidiaries and 
intermediary units within the MNC has resulted in an increased focus on interactions among units (Geppert et al., 
2016; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). This regio-centralization is (co-)constructed by acting on different 
dimensions of control (centralization, socialization, formalization and expatriation). A constant mutual alignment 
of control and coordination mechanisms takes place across the various control dimensions: 
• Socialization plays a major role, in line with what Conroy et al. (2017) call “micro- 
political strategies of alignment.” The RHQs are aligning with central HQs through 
increasing exchange. Corporate visits (HQs visits and short-term assignments) 
provide valuable informal platforms for exchanging knowledge and information. This 
corroborates the empirical findings of Nell et al. (2011, p. 98) that RHQs managers 
attempt to “increase their centrality in the MNC’s network.” The loadings that we find 
for HQs visits, short-term assignments and informal control clearly denote the 
importance of informal control mechanisms. Informal control, including the 
development of personal networks and the training role of RHQs, is a key mechanism 
of regio-centralization. This is in line with previous research (Ambos   et al., 2018; 
Decreton et al., 2019; Brenner and Ambos, 2013). 
• Formalization may be lessened thanks to the regio-centralization process, especially 
among large MNCs. The validation of H3 on reduced control by formalization 
indicates that less formal control at HQs is compensated for by more informal control 
 
 
at RHQs, a shift apparently secured through strengthened reporting practices. 
• Regarding expatriation, the invalidation of H4 shows that expatriates still have a  key 
role in regional structures and subsidiaries’ management. With regard to regio- 
centralization, it resonates with the socialization dimension. The main roles of 
expatriates are exerting control, implementing corporate culture overseas, 
coordinating activities and interacting with managers at HQs. 
 
Overall, as the structural path coefficients show, RHQs development positively affects centralization and 
socialization and to a lesser extent expatriation. On the contrary, it negatively affects formalization in the 
relationships between subsidiaries and HQs. 
Our statements on regio-centralization also resonate with Verbeke and Asmussen’s (2016) findings 
about regional strategy development by MNCs. These authors emphasize regional strategies as relevant in most 
industries where regional differences remain, leading to a reduction in costs due to regional economies of scales 
and responsiveness at regional levels. However, developing regional strategies requires capabilities to: 
• Identify regional opportunities for the firm. 
• Transfer non-location bound firm specific advantages (FSAs) from the home region 
to the host. 
• Nurture region-bound FSAs when possible by organizing activities in various parts 
of the host region, both internally and externally. 
To do so, RHQs should be staffed sufficiently, with both expatriates (H4 invalidated) and local staff, who exhibit 
an ability to transfer and nurture knowledge (socialization, H2). 
Overall, we see that the development of regional structures has a differentiated impact on the control dimensions 
of socialization, formalization, centralization and expatriation. This can probably be interpreted by the fact that 
centralization and formalization rely very largely on rules and procedures that can be administered from HQs, 
whereas socialization relies largely on interpersonal contacts and networks that are probably more effective at a 
regional level (Decreton et al., 2019). 
 
Conclusion 
With a sample of 86 French MNCs, we investigate the bridging role of RHQs in terms of coordination and control 
of activities in the Asia Pacific region. Our structural equation model allows us to test a set of hypotheses. 
We find especially that large MNCs, on a worldwide scale, with important sales in the 
Asia-Pacific region, set up in this region one or more regional management centers to which they transfer managerial 
functions. Our structural equation modeling reveals that these large MNCs grant regional control and decision-
making authority to their RHQs while not giving up centralized supervision, a feature that leads us to suggest the 
use of the expression regio-centralization. Furthermore, socialization is highly developed at RHQs, to some extent 
at the expense of formalization among the largest MNCs. RHQs become socialization hubs, where HQs managers 
on business visits, short-term assignees, expatriates and other Asia- Pacific managers meet, exchange information 
informally and develop social networks. Expatriation remains a crucial tool for controlling and developing 
activities in the region. However, large MNCs especially are in a process of transferring regional management 
responsibilities to local managers. Smaller MNCs, without RHQs in the Asia-Pacific region, base their control and 
coordination on the formalization of the HQs-subsidiary relationships, especially through strong reporting, in 
combination with centralized decision-making at the domestic HQs. 
This research is entirely based on MNCs from one specific country, France. Investigating 
cases from only one country helps neutralize some institutional variables, and the French case is not much studied 
in the international management literature. Furthermore, our research focuses on the Asia-Pacific as a host region, 
which is a highly dynamic area. Coordination and control in less dynamic regions of the world may reveal different 
characteristics, which would be useful to investigate. 
This study contributes to the ongoing conversation about regional strategy development by MNCs. Not only are 
RHQs key components for the coordination and control of activities throughout the host region, they also have a 
 
 
strategy formation role (Verbeke and Asmussen, 2016). The expression “regio-centralization” emphasizes the 
notion that when they create RHQs, MNCs do not give up centralized decision-making or control. Instead, they 
reorganize these activities by involving RHQs members. In this way, MNCs can resolve the problems that come 
with increasing size and complexity, as well as leverage resources and capabilities that they nurture at the RHQs 
level. Ultimately then, RHQs appear closely involved in coordination and control activities, on the one hand, and 





1. Appendix 2 gives a detailed overview of the operationalization of the indicating variables of the structural model. 
2. We programmed the SmartPLS 3 software with the following options, namely, Z-standardization, path-weighting scheme, a stop 
criterion of 10-7 and bootstrapping with 1,000 subsamples. 
3. The three omitted indicating variables were level of shared values, l = 0.29, sign. = 0.36 (socialization); number of written formal 
documents and procedures, l = 0.35, sign. = 0.34, (formalization) and number of key functions occupied by expatriates, l = 0.41, 
sign. = 0.24 (expatriation). 
4. Appendix 1 reproduces the graph of the full structural equation model, including the loadings and significance levels of the 12 
remaining significant indicating variables. 
5. To be specific, an outer loading between 0.4 and 0.7 is acceptable and retained if it is associated with a reflective construct for 
which the AVE > 0.50 and CR > 0.60 (Hair, 2016, p. 103). 
6. The collinearity assessment (Hair, 2016, p. 170) reveals variance inflation factors between 1.24 and 3.22 and tolerance levels 
between 0.31 and 0.81. 
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Figure A1. The full structural equation model, with path coefficients, loadings and significance levels, as produced by 
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Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
1. RHQ 0.67 0.47 – 
2. Important 
functions RHQ 3.10 2.52  0.83
** – 
3. Number of RMCs 
in APAC 1.09  1.18  0.62
** 0.71** – 
4. Centralization 
decision at HQs 2.38  1.19  0.27
* 0.15 0.16 – 
5. Centralization 
RHQ in APAC 2.46  1.19   0.41
** 0.56** 0.55** 0.06 – 
6. Short-term 
assignments APAC   3.20  1.02   0.41
** 0.41** 0.48** 0.15 0.30* – 
7. Informal control    3.44  0.85   0.21
*  0.23* 0.25* 0.18 0.08   0.42** – 
8. Level of training 
APAC 2.98  1.17   0.30
*  0.26*  0.24*  0.37** 0.11   0.18 0.41** – 
9. Level reporting 3.52  1.18  0.34
** 0.17 0.17 0.09 0.20   0.11 0.22* 0.16 – 
10. Level control by 
HQs 3.92 1.01  0.11 0.07 0.12 0.24
* 0.14   0.01 0.07  0.09 0.35** – 
11. Number 
expatriates in . 
APAC 14.1  23.3     0.12 0.20 0.18   -0.20 0.02  -0.03   -0.10   0.08   -0.23   0.26    – C 
12. Localization 2.56  0.96   0.28
*  0.249* 0.27*  0.24*  0.10    0.52** 0.42**0.39** 0.04 0.08 0.15  
Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01  
 
Table A2. Correlation matrix between 12 original indicating variables  
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